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DEFENDING EQUALITY: A VIEW 
FROM THE CAVE 
James S. Fishkin* 
SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY. 
By Michael Walzer. New York: Basic Books. 1983. Pp. xviii, 345. 
$19.95. 
The past decade has witnessed a remarkable resurgence of work 
on distributive justice. The core strategy sparking this revival, par-
ticularly in liberal theory, has been the attempt to design a suitably 
impartial procedure for choosing principles - one that gives equal 
consideration to everyone's interests by ruling out consideration of 
all irrelevant factors. Theories adopting this strategy start with the 
assumption that our common moral understandings are biased. 
They are irremediably contaminated by socialization, self-interest 
and perhaps self-deception. However, we can imagine a way of ar-
riving at principles that escape this contamination. While we do not 
live in a social world of objective moral notions, such notions may be 
available to us through thought experiments - hypothetical exer-
cises that permit us to shed enough of our biases to provide a firmer 
basis for principles of justice. 
John Rawls' A Theory of Justice 1 is the most influential example 
of this basic idea. But the same strategy can be found in Ronald 
Dworkin's notion of equal concern and respect,2 in Peter Singer's 
efforts to rehabilitate utilitarianism,3 in Bruce Ackerman's theory of 
neutral dialogue,4 and in the ideas of many others.5 This basic strat-
egy has proved so fruitful that it has taken on the character of a new 
liberal paradigm. 
Michael Walzer's new book stands in stark opposition to this en-
tire approach. His argument is "radically particularist.'' "I don't 
claim to have achieved any great distance from the social world in 
* Associate Professor of Political Science, Yale University. B.A. 1970, Ph.D. 1975 (Pol. 
Sci.), Yale University; Ph.D. 1976 (Phil.), Cambridge University. Professor Fishkin's books 
include JUSTICE, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, AND THE FAMILY (1983) (reviewed in this issue) and 
BEYOND SUBJECTIVE MORALITY (1984). - Ed. 
1. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
2. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). 
3. P. SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS (1979). 
4. B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980). 
5. See my TYRANNY AND LEGITIMACY: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL THEORIES (1979), Part 
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AND SOCIETY, FIFTH SERIES (P. Laslett & J. Fishkin eds. 1979). 
755 
756 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 82:755 
which I live," we are told in the Preface. Rather than "climb the 
mountain" to achieve "an objective and universal standpoint" he 
means to "stand in the cave, in the city, on the ground" and "inter-
pret to [his] fellow citizens the world of meanings that we share" (p. 
xiv). 
Though addressed to his "fellow citizens," Walzer's arguments 
are hardly limited to our own culture. He marshals examples of the 
distribution of social goods from across an astonishing range of his-
torical epochs and cultural conditions: Athenian Metics, modem Eu-
ropean guest workers, Medieval Jewish patterns of communal 
provision, the rise of Macy's in New York, and the ancient Chinese 
examination system, to mention only a few. Stylistically, the effort is 
a tour de force. We are given enough historical detail to glimpse 
these cases from the inside and to sense, if only for a few moments, 
what life with these practices may have been like. One could hardly 
imagine a more forceful counterpoint to the abstract and a historical 
theorizing of the new liberal paradigm. The book makes a distinc-
tive and new contribution to the debate over distributive justice. 
Walzer believes his theory has clear political implications. It is 
meant to prescribe "radical" solutions and condemn "tyranny" in all 
its forms, particularly in its "highest form," "modem totalitarian-
ism" (p. 316). But there are serious questions about whether Walzer 
can accomplish all that he aims from "within the cave" - by off er-
ing us only an account of justice that is "relative" to the "social 
meanings" that happen to be accepted within a given society (pp. 
312-14). 
Walzer's _central claim is that there are qualitatively distinct "so-
cial goods" and that "internal" to our understanding of each good 
are criteria for its distribution within its own sphere. "Tyranny" oc-
curs when a given good is distributed for reasons irrelevant to those 
criteria, typically through command over other goods (from another 
sphere) which are "dominant" in society, such as capital. Thus, Me-
dieval Christians condemned the sin of simony, for example, because 
"the meaning of a particul~r social good, ecclesiastical office, ex-
cluded its sale and purchase" (p. 9). Similar objections apply to 
prostitution and political bribery; given certain shared understand-
ings about how sexual gratification and political power are supposed 
to be distributed, the intrusion of money is a morally irrelevant de-
terminant, one that perverts those shared understandings. Such in-
trusions violate a general principle which Walzer formulates as 
follows: 
No social good x should be distributed to men and women who possess 
some other good y merely because they possess y and without regard to 
the meaning of x. [P. 20]. 
Obviously, everything depends on the "meaning of x," the 
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"shared understandings" about each good and its respective sphere 
in a given culture. Walzer's chapters are organized around his list of 
goods: membership, security and welfare, money and commodities, 
office, hard work, free time, education, kinship and love, divine 
grace, recognition, and political power. Is this an exhaustive list? 
Would we all interpret our shared understandings about the spheres 
this way? Others have proposed quite different lists of the primary 
social goods whose distribution defines the problem of justice. For 
the design of institutions, Rawls' list reduces to liberty, equal oppor-
tunity and income and wealth. Harold Lasswell, in a famous analy-
sis, proposed power, enlightenment, wealth, well-being, skill, 
affection, rectitude, and deference. 6 How are we to decide between 
alternative lists? 
For Walzer, the issue comes down to a problem of social anthro-
pology - an investigation and interpretation of shared understand-
ings about social goods and their boundaries in a particular culture. 
Throughout the book, he treats his own list as canonical and does 
not compare it, in any detail, to serious rivals. Yet, the problem of 
prescription, in any given culture, will be complicated for his relativ-
istic theory if the culture contains rival notions of social goods and 
their boundaries. Rather than confront this problem directly, Walzer 
raises it parenthetically at the end of his book: 
(When people disagree about the meaning of social goods, when un-
derstandings are controversial, then justice requires that the society be 
faithful to the disagreements, providing institutional channels for their 
expression, adjudicative mechanisms, and alternative distributions.) 
[P. 313]. 
Yet there will also be good faith disagreements about how to re-
solve disagreements in good faith, how to design channels for polit-
ical expression, and how to adjudicate disputes. We lack . shared 
understandings about how to interpret whatever shared understand-
ings actually exist among us in our culture. How can a theory based 
on no more than "shared understandings" presume to displace rival 
interpretations of the same phenomena? Walzer's position would be 
strengthened if he developed criteria for such a comparison. But he 
could hardly do so without "leaving the cave" and abstracting from 
(at least some) of our shared understandings. For such criteria 
would have to be based on more than shared understandings, on 
more than common conventions, where we lack (as we commonly 
do) conventional criteria for this anthropological exercise. To apply 
his relativistic theory to the moral controversies he discusses, Walzer 
would require criteria for choosing among rival accounts of our 
shared moral notions. Without such criteria, his theory is threatened 
with silence in the face of serious moral controversy. But he cannot 
6. See, e.g., H. LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN, POWER AND SOCIETY 55-56 (1950). 
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develop such criteria without abandoning the relativism at the foun-
dations of his theory.7 
Suppose, however, that moral cultures are not so difficult to in-
terpret. Suppose, for purposes of argument, that each society has 
one and only one list of goods and that there are clearly established 
boundaries for distributive spheres. Even so, I believe, Walzer 
would face considerable difficulty establishing the political implica-
tions that seem to be central to his argument - requirements for the 
relief of refugees, the defense of equality, and the attack on 
totalitarianism. 
In his chapter on "Membership," Walzer treats the problem of 
refugees- "necessitous strangers." Walzer argues that the principle 
of "[m]utual aid extends across political (and also cultural, religious, 
and linguistic) frontiers" (p. 33, emphasis added). Here "[i]t is the 
absence of any cooperative arrangements that sets the context for 
mutual aid: two strangers meet at sea or in the desert or, as in the 
Good Samaritan story, by the side of the road" (p. 33, emphasis 
added). Perhaps Walzer is merely offering an interpretation of our 
morality. Yet, he formulates mutual aid as a general principle and 
applies it to other cultures and countries. For example, he condemns 
the "White Australia" policy: 
The right of white Australians to the great empty spaces of the subcon-
tinent rested on nothing more than the claim they had staked, and en-
forced against the aboriginal population, before anyone else. That 
does not seem a right that one would readily defend in the face of 
necessitous men and women, clamoring for entry. [P. 46]. 
While some individuals may " 'need' hundreds or even thousands of 
empty miles for the life they have chosen," Walzer concludes, "such 
needs cannot be given moral priority over the claims of necessitous 
strangers" (p. 47). 
While Walzer's position on this issue seems eminently reason-
able, how can he reconcile it with his relativism? The shared under-
standings within Australia, as Walzer notes, focused on "the 
elementary right of every government, to decide the composition of 
the nation," a right which was understood as ''just the same preroga-
tive as the head of a family exercises as to who is to live in his own 
house" (p. 46).8 And Walzer's basic methodological position holds 
that an appeal to shared understandings is necessary for moral 
argument: 
It is to these understandings that we must appeal when we make our 
arguments - all of us, not philosophers alone; for in matters of moral-
7. I pursue some of these issues in BEYOND SUBJECTIVE MORALITY: ETHICAL REASONING 
AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (1984). 
8. Walzer is here quoting an Australian Minister of Immigration from H.I. LONDON, NoN-
WHJTE IMMIGRATION AND THE "WHITE AUSTRALIA POLICY" 98 (1971). 
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ity, argument simply is the appeal to common meanings. [P. 29, empha-
sis added]. 
It is one thing for Walzer to argue that we must take in necessi-
tous strangers, given our moral culture.9 It is quite another thing to 
argue that the Australians erred in their immigration policy in the 
face of the predominant understanding, in their society at the time, 
of how they ought to regulate membership. Walzer might reply at 
this point that those immigration policies were not without contro-
versy and that dissenting voices give him a foothold for judgment. 
But a successful development of this reply would require criteria for 
choosing among alternative social understandings and, in this case, 
criteria for overturning the apparently predominant understanding 
and replacing it with a dissenting one. As we saw above, Walzer has 
not developed such criteria. This methodological issue gets only 
passing reference in the book. 
There are similar questions to be raised about Walzer's defense 
of "complex equality," under which "no citizen's standing . . . with 
r~gard to one social good can be undercut by his standing . . . with 
regard to some other social good" (p. 19). At some points, Walzer 
describes his purpose as the modest one of description and clarifica-
tion: "My purpose in this book is to describe a society where no 
social good serves or can serve as a means of domination" (p. xiv, 
emphasis added). Yet, from the subtitle of the book on, the basic 
thrust is to prescribe and defend; the entire effort is offered to us as a 
"defense of pluralism and equality." This defense is based on three 
general principles which Walzer is able to "tease-out" of his histori-
cal examples (p. 75): 
[T]hat every political community must attend to the needs ofjts mem-
bers as they collectively understand those needs; that the goods that are 
distributed must be distributed in proportion to need; and that the dis-
tribution must recognize and uphold the underlying equality of mem-
bership. [P. 84]. 
Walzer blunts the force of these three principles in the next sen-
tence. Where do these principles apply? "[T]o any community, in 
fact, where the members are each other's equals (before God or the 
law), or where it can plausibly be said that, however they are treated 
in fact, they ought to be each other's equals" (p. 84). However, 
where the shared understandings do not include underlying equality, 
the principles don't apply. For example, "[t]he principles probably 
don't apply to a community organized hierarchically, as in tradi-
tional India" (p. 84). Walzer's "defense" of equality is, at bottom, 
undermined by his relativism. Where equality is already the shared 
understanding, he has a basis for prescribing equality. But where 
inequality or hierarchy is the shared understanding, he can neither 
9. I discuss such responsibilities in detail in THE LIMITS OF OBLIGATION (1982). 
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defend nor impose equality. His prescriptions are directed only to 
communities of the already convinced. Those who expect an argu-
ment that conforms to the subtitle are bound to be disappointed by 
such limitations. 
Walzer's relativism also undermines his attack on totalitarianism. 
For him there are no criteria, except shared understandings within 
the culture, for the alteration and manipulation of that culture. Im-
agine a totalitarian regime that happens to succeed in the task that 
many have attempted - brainwashing its citizens into accepting a 
set of shared understandings about the proper sphere of its political 
power. Once such shared understandings are accepted, there are no 
grounds within the confines of Walzer's relativism to condemn the 
regime. The expansion of political power onto virtually every other 
sphere of life (as the boundaries were previously drawn) cannot con-
stitute "tyranny" on Walzer's definition once that expansion is sup-
ported by the culture's shared understandings. Thus, once an 
Orwellian regime operates perfectly, once it succeeds in totally 
manipulating its own political culture, its totalitarianism is trans-
muted into justice by Walzer's relativism. Rather than providing us 
with the ultimate grounds for condemning totalitarianism, Walzer 
has laid the groundwork for its defense - provided only that 
thought control and propaganda are sufficiently effective. 
In a recent book, Barrington Moore demonstrated how many of 
the most disturbing cases of injustice and exploitation involve ac-
ceptance by the victims of the ideology rationalizing their vic-
timhood.10 Provided that those ideologies are the accepted ones 
within a given culture, a consistent relativism provides no grounds 
for contrary evaluation. The same argument that Moore applied to 
untouchables, ascetics and even some concentration camp victims 
can be applied to entire regimes. If an entire society is victimized by 
a totalitarian regime - but it has been thoroughly brainwashed to 
accept these abuses of power as legitimate - then surely Walzer's 
impulse to label the resulting totalitarianism the "highest form of 
tyranny" is correct. But he cannot consistently do so within the con-
fines of relativism. According to his theory the very meaning of jus-
tice would have been altered for that culture. Tyranny would have 
become justice. 
We require trans-cultural criteria for the alteration and permissi-
ble manipulation of moral cultures. But such criteria would require 
that we "leave the cave" and abstract from the vagaries of our own 
particular culture. Walzer insists on keeping his feet on the ground. 
As a result, his book does not provide the "defense of pluralism and 
equality'' that he promises. 
10. B. MOORE, INJUSTICE: THE SOCIAL BASES OF OBEDIENCE AND REVOLT (1978). 
